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Abstract
Dynamic optimization problems cover a large class of problems in theoretical and
applied economics. A simple iterative algorithm with fast convergence is proposed. It
is demonstrated that the algorithm in a few steps produce excellent analytic (closed
form) approximations including error bounds to a class of nonlinear problems.The
algorithmic scheme is also well suited to produce numerical solutions. The notions
of dynamic and potential rents are operationalized. The algorithm is utilizing a
relation balancing these concepts. The result is particularly strong in the case of zero
discounting where the exact CU-optimal policy is determined in a single step.
Applying a particular seed in the general convergent scheme reproduces in a simple
way results (formulas) published in the last decade in bioeconomics.
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Keywords: Closed form approximations; Contraction algorithm; Renewable re-
source economics; Capital dynamic modeling; Zero discounting and
optimality
1
1 Introduction
A large class of theoretical and applied research problems can be modeled by a dynamic op-
timization process. The classical formulations, like Hamilton’s principle in mechanics, being
the variational approach and the optimal control theory in economics like the Pontryagin’s
maximum principle or the general dynamic programming approach.
In this account the exploitation of a renewable capital stock is rewritten into a form
suitable for marginal contribution interpretation by defining two new mappings (M and N)
which we label as dynamic rent and potential rent. The feasible policy that balances these
two rents represents the optimal policy in feedback form. Moreover, the balancing equation
gives rise to a contraction mapping. A simple iterative algorithm is shown to converge rapidly
to a solution. A remarkably simple error control is also provided. The algorithm can be used
as a tool to obtain closed form (analytical) feedback approximations. It is also efficient in
obtaining numerical solutions.
We start with the mathematical formulation of the model in section two. The main result
is also presented in this section. The account given is kept brief. Further explanations and
details needed to fully appreciate the ideas involved are given in appendices A and B for the
sake of readability. Basic definition, assumptions and proofs are laid out in an natural way
in these appendices to avoid cluttering the main exposition with technicalities. In section
three we revisit two real world examples from the literature and demonstrate that our new
solution procedure is working very well. The theorem derived is constructive and can be
used directly to produce numerical as well as analytical approximations. Moreover, it has a
nice property in the limit of vanishing discounting. In this limit it produces the exact (CU-)
optimal1 solution in a single ”iteration”.
The modeling approach and results presented in this paper are, however, of a more
general character than the special field of application we focus on here i.e. ideas from
natural renewable resource management2.
The main part of paper is divided into 4 sections followed by two appendixes. Following
the introduction, section 2 establishes the model. It outlines the feedback policy setting and
introduces the main concepts of dynamic and potential rents and their balancing equation
that constitutes the key contraction relation for iterations with given error bounds. In sec-
tion 3 we apply the theory on real world bioeconomic examples from the fishery management
literature and demonstrate that our new approach works well numerically as well as analyt-
1See Seierstad and Sydsæter (1999) for a definition of CU-optimality.
2See e.g. Arnason, Sandal, Steinshamn, and Vestergaard (2004); Sandal and Steinshamn (2001a, 2000);
Grafton, Sandal, and Steinshamn (2000); Sandal and Steinshamn (1998) and Clark (1990).
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ically. It generalizes earlier results found and provide well-defined error bounds where they
were not previously available. Section 4 is a brief summary and discussion. Key features are
a simple scheme, fast contraction3 and error control.
2 The Model
In managing renewable resources the following class of problems is of interest. Obtain
max
u˜∈U
∫ ∞
0
e−δtΠ(x(t), u˜(t))dt ,(1)
where x ∈ X, u˜ ∈ U and X, U are intervals. Here Π is a twice differentiable and strictly
concave function of u˜. The discount rate δ is nonnegative. To avoid unnecessary technicalities
it is sufficient in our context to assume that x = x(t) and u˜ = u˜(t) are piecewise smooth4
and x = x(t) is continuous. The maximization is to be performed subject to the constraining
state equation5
x˙
def
=
dx
dt
= f(x)− u˜ .(2)
Our main objective is not to derive existence or uniqueness results but to provide a simple
scheme for getting closed form approximations to a class of nonlinear real-world problems.
We may assume that some criteria for existence of an optimal solution are satisfied, e.g. that
of the Mangasarin sufficiency and uniqueness theorem for the Catching-Up optimality6. In
this work we take for granted the existence of at least one optimal policy and we focus solely
on conditions ensuring our approach to pick an optimal control path in state and policy
space. In the problems we have in mind x may be interpreted as a measure of the stock level
of a renewable resource, u˜ the harvest rate and f(x) the natural surplus growth rate of the
resource.
In the next section we present an alternative formulation by introducing the notions of
dynamic and potential rent. These quantities play a similar role in our problem as potential
and kinetic energy do in classical mechanics.
3Only few iterations are needed for good approximations.
4The term is short for functions with a continuous derivative except at a finite number of points.
5The approach in this paper can be generalized to a larger class of state equations. We have chosen a
simple form to avoid cluttering the presentation and interpretations with too many technicalities.
6See e.g. theorem 13 on page 234 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1999).
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2.1 The Feedback Approach
Here we consider the state and control space and treat time t as a redundant parameter. In
this space we examine piecewise continuously differential functions u = u(x), usually called
policies in feedback form7 or control paths. We allow for discontinuities in the derivative as
well as in the function itself at a finite number of points. The model can be formulated as
an integral equation
M(x, u) = N˜(x)[u, α] ,(3)
where
M(x, u)
def
= Π(x, u) + Πu(x, u) {f(x)− u} − S(x) ,(4)
and
S(x)
def
= Π(x, f(x)) .(5)
Furthermore
N˜(x)[u, α]
def
= K(α)− S(x) + δ ·
∫ x
α
Πu(s, u(s))ds ,(6)
where α andK(α) are parameters to be determined. We have by definition thatM(x, f(x)) ≡
0. A derivation of Eq. (3) is offered in appendix A. The equation in simplified form reads
Π(x, u) + {f(x)− u} · Πu(x, u) = K(α) + δ ·
∫ x
α
Πu(s, u(s))ds .(7)
The formulation given in Eq. (3) is preferred due to the nice properties held by the operators
M and N˜ . Before establishing these properties we give some interpretations of the different
terms involved. Notice thatM is an explicit given function while N˜ is a functional depending
on the state x, an interval in state space and a policy function u over the interval. More details
concerning the properties ofM and N˜ are stated and proved through a series of propositions
and lemmas in appendix B. In the present setting Eq. (2) is actually redundant and only
serves the purpose of connecting the problem to the time domain. Interpretations of the
terms in Eq. (3) within a typical economic framework are the time rates
Π ∼ rent,
(f − u) · Πu ∼ saving/investments,
S(x) ∼ sustainable rent,
K(α) ∼ rent in a reference state,
7By definition u = u(x(t)) = u˜(t) and hence u = u(x) is the feedback form of the policy.
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δ ·
∫ x
α
Πu(s, u(s))ds ∼ running cost or gain in moving between α and x.
We observe that M is made up of the first three terms in the above list where the two
first terms represent the net total gain. The third term represents sustainable rent, that is
the rent obtained by freezing the situation, hence M can be interpreted as the net gain by
changing the state and we refer to it as dynamic rent. It follows directly from the definition
of M and the concavity of Π that the dynamic rent is non-negative. On the other hand N˜ is
made up by the last three terms on the list and is thereby a measure of the net accumulated
cost of changing the state by following a particular path and we refer to it as the potential
rent.
We have that M = N˜ is the point of balance in marginal contributions in time. Thus the
optimal policy corresponds to the case where we have a decreasing marginal contribution by
following an optimal policy in time, i.e. M → 0 with time as we are approaching a stationary
state. It is seen from the definition of the dynamic rent that it resembles the notion of kinetic
energy in physics by noticing that
M(x, u) = −Πuu(x, u)(f(x)− u)2 + o((f(x)− u)2) = 1
2
mx˙2 + o(x˙2),
and m = −2Πuu(x, u) > 0 and x˙ represent the mass and velocity of a rigid body. Thus our
problem is similar to a physical situation where an object is moving towards an equilibrium
position in a manner such that the kinetic energy Ek =
1
2
mv2 associated with the dynamics
is decreasing over time. We are looking for a position to end motion by asking: Which states
(α-values) are possible ”parking” spots? In analogy with the physical picture it will be the
states with extreme potential energy which in our setting implies a state which maximize the
potential rent subject to being at rest or fixed. Restricting ourselves to an inner optimum
we obtain
α = argmax
α∈X
N˜ ⇒

K(α) = S(α) = Π(α, f(α)) ,
K ′(α) = δ · Πu(α, u(α)) = δ ∗ µ(α) ,
u(α) = f(α) ,
implying
S ′(α) = δ · µ(α) where µ(x) def= Πu(x, f(x)) .(8)
It has been shown by Sandal and Steinshamn (1997b) that relation (8) is the general equi-
librium condition. The term S ′(α) is the marginal change in the sustainable rent due to a
marginal change in stock/state level and δµ(α) represents the alternative rate of return this
change can earn. Eq. (8) is a compact form of the equilibrium relation in natural renewable
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resource economics and it is sometimes referred to as the Golden Rule. It simply states that
the marginal value added by not utilizing a unit of the resource is equal to the marginal
gain of utilizing it. If such a resource level exists, the management regime will be indifferent
whether to utilize the resource unit or not and hence the resource level becomes a settling
down state.
In the present context we assume that such a state exists and is determined by solving
Eq. (8). It is chosen to be our point of reference. We label it α = x∗δ . If there is more
than one solution we choose one that maximize S. Notice that it is sufficient that the scalar
function S˜(x) = S(x)− δ ∫ µ(x)dx is strictly concave for a unique equilibrium to exist. See
Sandal and Steinshamn (1997b) for further details.
2.2 Main Result
In order to present the main result in a compact way we list some key definitions and
assumptions.
The playground in state and control space is A∗ given by
A∗
def
= {(x, u) | (x− x∗δ)(f(x)− u) ≤ 0, x ∈ X, u ∈ U} ,(9)
Paths restricted to the set A∗ represents policies that do not move the state away from its
optimal stationary level. The following assumption is expected to hold throughout the rest
of the paper:
A1 The function Π(x, u) is twice differentiable in its arguments with Πu ≥ 0 and
0 < m1(x) ≤ −Πuu(x, u) ≤ m2(x) <∞ on (x, u) ∈ A∗ ,
for a pair of integrable functions m1 and m2.
We also need the following relations
M(x, u) = Π(x, u) + Πu(x, u) {f(x)− u} − S(x)
N(x, u)
def
= S∗δ − S(x) + δ ·
∫ x
x∗
δ
Πu(s, u(s))ds = N˜(x)[u, x
∗
δ ] ,(10)
S∗δ
def
= S(x∗δ) = Π(x
∗
δ , f(x
∗
δ)) ,(11)
Definition 1 Admissible Controls
Admissible controls (feedback policies) are u = u(x) ∈ PS(X) where PS(X) is the set of
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piecewise smooth and bounded functions such that (x, u(x)) ∈ A∗.
A sequence is called an admissible if all the terms in the sequence are admissible controls.
We can now state our main result in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Convergence and Error Bounds
Any infinite admissible sequence {vn} produced by M(x, vn+1) = N(x, vn) for an arbitrary
seed v0, converge to the unique admissible solution u satisfyingM(x, u) = N(x, u). Moreover,
if {vn} is a super-sub sequence (e.g. v0 = f(x)) then u = 12(vn−1 + vn) + ² where |²| ≤
1
2
|vn − vn−1|.
The proof of this theorem is rather tedious. Details are given in Appendix B. The core
in the proof is the construction of enveloping sequences that are alternating around the
unique solution (sub-super solutions). This construction is reflected in the error bound
given. The theorem is constructive in the sense that one can choose freely a seed function
or a collection of numerical points representing the function and start iterating. Any kind
of proper numerical integrator can be used in evaluating the right hand side in the iteration
scheme if one wishes to find numerical approximations/solutions. We will here emphasize
that the theorem gives an easy way to find analytic bounds on the solution and thereby
analytical (closed form) approximations to the solution.
Solutions are particularly easy to find when δ → 0.8 In this limit equation (7) becomes
the ordinary equation M(x, u) + S(x) = S∗0 for the feedback policy u(x). Formally this
limit can be interpreted as a generalized optimality. That is, even though different policies
may create infinite large utilities there are no value of a discount rate that can alter the
practical result that ”two dollars a day is better than one dollar a day for infinitely long
time”. Catching-Up optimality (CU-optimality) is a generalization along theses ideas. This
and other natural extensions of the notion of optimality can be found in e.g. Seierstad and
Sydsæter (1999). The formal solution of this equation is in fact a separatrix in phase space
going through the reference point x∗0. The equation itself is a convenient way of stating the
fact that the Hamiltonian is conserved in this special case.
8The zero discounting case is problematic in classical numerical infinite horizon approaches. The CU-
optimal feedback policy limit is also hard in modern viscosity solution approach. See e.g. Fleming and Soner
(1993) on page 371.
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3 Examples from Fisheries Management
In this section we exemplify the strength and applicability of our main result by reproducing
some published results. Both examples are illustrations of the potential power of theorem 1.
We revisit two important bioeconomic cases in fishery management. Both cases concern the
problem of determining the total allowable catch (TAC) quotas. Our main result is by no
means limited to this class of problem. Among others, the papers, Sandal and Steinshamn
(1998, 2000, 2001b) and McDonald, Sandal, and Steinshamn (2002) deal with models that
can be suitably handled with the procedure described in this paper.
3.1 A Northern Cod Fishery Model
This is a non-trivial illustration of the potential our procedure has to offer by producing
good analytical results without specifying a model in full details. In Grafton, Sandal, and
Steinshamn (2000) the collapse of the Canadian Northern Cod Fishery was investigated by
using a model defined by the economic relations
Π(x, u) = P (u)u− C(x, u) , P (u) = a p1 + u p0
a+ u
, C(x, u) = q
u
x
.(12)
The prices p0 and p1 are the minimum and the maximum prices, a the flexibility parameter
in the inverse demand function and q is the derived cost parameter measuring the cost per
unit output per unit biomass. The biomass is assumed to be updated according to
x˙ = f(x)− u = r x (1− x
K
)α − u(13)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate for the biomass and K is the stock’s carrying capacity in
terms of biomass. The parameter α is measuring how much the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) is skewed to left or right of the MSY in the logistic model (at x = 0.5K for α = 1).
The problem is naturally restricted to the region x = [0, K]. Applying the appropriate
definitions we get
M(x, u) =
a2(p1 − p0)
a+ f(x)
·
[
(f(x)− u)
(a+ u)
]2
,(14)
S(x) = Π(x, f(x)) = (a p1 + f(x) p0)
f(x)
a+ f(x)
− qf(x)
x
,(15)
Πu(x, u) = p0 − q
x
+
(p1 − p0)a2
(a+ u)2
,(16)
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µ(x) = Πu(x, f(x)) ,
N(x, u) = S(x∗)− S(x) + δ p0(x− x∗)− δ q ln
(
x
x∗
)
+ δ (p1 − p0) a2
∫ x
x∗
ds
(a+ u(s))2
(17)
= Sˆ(x) + δ (p1 − p0) a2
∫ x
x∗
ds
(a+ u(s))2
.
The reference state x∗δ is the solution of S
′(x) = δ µ(x). It is worth pointing out that we
have an exact formula for the feedback policy in the limit of vanishing discounting. In
this case we must interpret the optimality in a generalized sense, e.g., the CU-optimality9.
The iteration scheme M(x, un+1) = N(x, un), can be started with the static optimal policy
making Πu(x, u0) = 0, which is the same as neglecting the discount rate in the first iteration.
Thus it gives the exact discount free solution. We get explicit closed form expression for
{u0, u1} from
Πu(x, u0) = p0 − q
x
+ (p1 − p0) a
2
(a+ u0)2
= 0
and
Sˆ(x) = S(x∗)− S(x) + δ · p0 · (x− x∗)− δ · q · ln(x/x∗) = a
2(p1 − p0)
a+ f(x)
·
[
f(x)− u1
a+ u1
]2
The second iteration is for all practical purposes the solution. This is the same type
of solution we get if we use classical perturbation theory with the discount rate as the
perturbation parameter, see Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a,c). In our setting it is just a
result of a particular choice of seed in our general iteration scheme10. Notice that the system
becomes singular when p1 = p0, signaling that only the equilibrium point fits the equation.
This is in fact what we will expect since we then know that the optimal behavior is a bang-
bang policy with the switch at the equilibrium point. The CU -optimal policy in the limit
δ → 0 is given by u = u1,
u1(x) =
aΛ(x) + f(x)
1− Λ(x) , Λ(x)
def
= sgn (x− x∗δ)
√√√√(a+ f(x))Sˆ(x)
a2(p1 − p0) ,(18)
where the signum function stems from the definition of the region A∗.
9See Seierstad and Sydsæter (1999) for different extensions of the notion of optimality in the infinite
horizon case.
10An even better approximation is produced by using u0 = k x as seed, a line through two known points
on the true solution if k = f(x
∗
δ)
x∗
δ
.
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Figure 1: This figure shows the function f(x) = u0 (starts at (0, 0) and ends at (1, 0), and the
approximate optimal harvests u1, u2, u3. The common point for all curves is (x
∗
δ , u(x
∗
δ)), the
equilibrium point. Absolute error bounds after 1,2,3 iterations: 0.058, 0.00167, 0.0000577.
Discount rate is 5%. Considering the curves for x < x∗δ , the lower curve is u1, the upper
curve is u2 and u3 is the middle curve. This can be seen more clearly in the window where
a short portion of these curves are enlarged. The unique solution u∗ is located in between
u2 and u3. This demonstrates that u =
1
2
(u2 + u3) is a very good approximation. Stock and
harvest are scaled by the carrying capacity (K).
The above seed in the iterative process is only worth working with if we need a formula for
the solution. In the numerical analysis we can start with any function in the relevant region.
However, u0 = f(x) is an excellent choice since it is a super-sub solution.
11 By applying
the parameter values from Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a) r = 0.3036, K = 3.2 × 106,
α = 0.3587, pmin = 200, pmax = 1250, a = 0.139× 106, q = 2.006× 108. We have plotted the
iterative solutions {u0, u1, u2, u3} for the case δ = 5%.
3.2 Bluefin Tuna
In the article McDonald, Sandal, and Steinshamn (2002), a bioeconomic model for Bluefin
Tuna in the Southern hemisphere is investigated. We illustrate our technique by applying it
11A super-sub solution is any function that is a super solution to the left of x = x∗δ , and a sub solution to
the right, i.e. it is not below the true solution to the left and not above it to the right of x = x∗δ .
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on this model. We summarize the basics in the following relations
Π(x, u) = γ(x)u− Γ(x)u2 − α(x) , x˙ = f(x)− u .(19)
The dynamic and potential rates are
M(x, u) = Γ(x)(u− f(x))2 ,
Πu(x, u) = γ(x)− 2 Γ(x) u ,
µ(x) = γ(x)− 2 Γ(x) f(x) ,
S(x) = γ(x) f(x)− Γ(x) (f(x))2 − α(x) ,
N(x, u) = S(x∗δ)− S(x) + δ
∫ x
x∗
δ
γ(s)ds− 2δ
∫ x
x∗
δ
Γ(s)u(s)ds
= Sˆ(x)− 2δ
∫ x
x∗δ
Γ(s)u(s)ds .
Hence the iterations can be explicitly calculated, giving
un+1(x) = f(x) + sgn (x− x∗δ)
√√√√ Sˆ(x)
Γ(x)
− 2δ
Γ(x)
∫ x
x∗
δ
Γ(s)un(s)ds .(20)
Using the myopic policy (the infinite discounting solution) as seed, i.e. u0 = γ(x)/(2 Γ(x)),
we get the exact zero-discounting solution in the first iteration which also was the case in
the former example. This behavior is a general property of our procedure.
In the appendix we prove the general statement that any super (sub) seed generates a
sequence alternating between super and sub solutions. In the above example we started
with a tight super solution (myopic or static policy) and next iterate is a tight sub solution
(exact zero discount solution). It should be rather obvious from a practical interpretation
of the problem that the myopic harvest is larger than the first best and the zero discounting
harvest is too conservative.
We state the basic input functions for the Bluefin Tuna problem given in McDonald,
Sandal, and Steinshamn (2002). The fish stock is modeled by a surplus growth function
with critical depensation12
Π = a · u− b · u2 − d
x
, f(x) = r · (x− k) · (1− x
K
) ,(21)
where the following parameter values are used: r = 0.2246, K = 0.565 × 106, a = 88.25,
12Critical depensation implies that the stock goes extinct by itself if the stock falls below a given level.
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Figure 2: This figure shows the function u0 = f(x) (ends at (1, 0)), and the approximate
optimal harvest u1, u2, u3. The common point for all curves is (x
∗
δ , u(x
∗
δ)), the equilibrium
point. Absolute error bounds after 1,2,3 iterations are: 0.041, 0.00289, 0.000246. Discount
rate was set to 5%. Considering the curves for x > x∗δ , the upper curve is u1 and u2 is
the lowest curve. Furthermore u3 is the middle curve. The unique solution u
∗ is located in
between u2 nd u3. This demonstrates that u =
1
2
(u2 + u3) is a very good approximation.
Stock and harvest are scaled by the carrying capacity (K).
b = 9.0 × 10−4, d = 1.63 × 1011, k = 0.716 × 106. Results are plotted in figure 2. The
approximate optimal solutions displayed in figures 1 and 2 are in excellent agreement with
the cited references.
4 Summary
We have presented a novel procedure to solve a class of non-linear infinite horizon control
problems. By introducing the new general notions of dynamic rent and potential rent we
obtain an equation for the optimal feedback policy by balancing the two types of rents. This
balancing equation gives rise to a contraction mapping with extra nice properties that can
be utilized to make a robust iteration scheme for determining numerically as well as analyt-
ically the feedback policy with explicit error bounds. In the case of vanishing discounting
(the autonomous case) the balancing of the dynamic and potential rent yields and ordinary
(algebraic) equation for the Catching-Up optimal feedback policy.
The case with a single state and control is important. Lumped variables are often the
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best approach to many applications in bioeconomics because the policy tools in many cir-
cumstances are rough and on an accumulated level. This simplification may be a result of
practical limitations on how the policy can be implemented. A lot of fisheries around the
world are managed by setting the total annual catch (TAC). It is no point in having models
cluttered with more details than what are present in the real decision process on the real
decision level. The art of modeling is closely related to the ability to make models as simple
as possible and still capture the main features set out to be explored. It is a typical pitfall
to try to model as much as possible in a single approach. The result is loss of clarity and
causality. It becomes impossible to anchor the model in a proper way to the real world.
There is simply too much uncertainty floating around and too many parameters that can
not be resolved from data. In any case it is a good approach to check and evaluate more
complex models by how they perform compared to proper (preferable analytical) solutions
of some non-trivial degenerated cases of the model. Our approach picks up nonlinear effects
in an easy and transparent way. Thus we believe that our results can be of some value.
In the examples presented from the current literature, a few iterations are sufficient to
obtain an approximate solution of very high quality and accuracy. This is demonstrated in
a striking way in figures 1 and 2.
There are many interesting features in our formulation. The economic interpretations of
M as dynamic rent and N as potential rent and their properties are the most prominent.
Another basic feature is the source term in the iterations scheme, N (the integral term), which
is the only place where the discount rate, δ, enters explicitly. The fact that the discount rate
is typically a small quantity suggests that the exact solution for δ = 0 contains the proper
behavior that stems from the nonlinearity in the problem. This policy is straight forward
to obtain in our scheme (”a single iteration”). A small discount rate is mainly shifting the
policy slightly upwards. This statement does of course only hold for the policy. The value
function itself may change dramatically, i.e. become infinitely large in the limit of zero
discounting. In classical perturbational approach the discount rate may have a significant
impact on the speed of convergence as has been established in the referenced papers. In the
context of the present paper the classical perturbational (i.e an asymptotic series approach)
is just a consequence of a particular choice of seed in a general procedure. Hence it is a way
to check the quality of such asymptotic series.
The convergence rate can actually be investigated analytically and this analysis brings
forward this feature. We do not include the details of this analysis in the present account
because a numerical check of the accuracy is easily available due to simple error bounds. The
fact that very few iterations produce a sufficiently accurate solution offers the possibility to
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analytically determine an approximate solution. This is a much more powerful tool for
parameter adaption in any modeling procedure than any particular numerical solution can
offer.
Finally, we believe that the procedure and results outlined in this paper can be carried
over to the analogous finite horizon problems. By using the appropriate transversality con-
ditions it should be possible two pick out a point on the optimal policy which then serves
the role as our reference point and replaces α = x∗δ in the present exposition.
References
Arnason, R., L. K. Sandal, S. I. Steinshamn, and N. Vestergaard (2004): “Opti-
mal Feedback Controls: Comparative Evaluation of the Cod fisheries in Denmark, Iceland
and Norway,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(2), 531–542.
Bardi, M., and I. C. Dolcetta (1997): Optimal Control and Viscosity Solutions of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations, System Control. Birkhauser Boston Inc, Boston.
Clark, C. W. (1990): Mathematical Bioeconomics The Optimal Management of Renewable
Resources. New York, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Fleming, W. H., and H. M. Soner (1993): Controlled Markov Processes and Viscosity
Solutions. Springer-Verlag.
Grafton, R., L. K. Sandal, and S. I. Steinshamn (2000): “How to improve the
management of renewable resources: The case of Canada’s northern cod fishery,” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(3), 570–580.
McDonald, D., L. K. Sandal, and S. I. Steinshamn (2002): “Implications of a nested
Stochastic/Deterministic Bio-Economic Model for a Pelagic Fishery,” Ecological Modelling,
149(1-2), 193–201.
Sandal, L. K., and S. I. Steinshamn (1997a): “A feedback model for optimal man-
agement of renewable natural capital stocks,” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic
Sciences, 54, 2475–2482.
(1997b): “Optimal Steady State and the Effect of Discounting,” Marine Resource
Economics, 12, 95–105.
14
(1997c): “A Stochastic Feedback Model for Optimal Management of Renewable
Resources,” Natural Resource Modeling, 10, 31–52.
(1998): “Dynamic corrective taxes with flow and stock externalities: A feedback
approach,” Natural Resource Modeling, 11, 217–239.
(2000): “The Cost of Underutilization of Labour in Fisheries,” Annals of Operations
Research, 94, 1–13.
(2001a): “A Bio-economic model for Namibian Pilchard,” The South African Jour-
nal of Economics, 69(2), 1–24.
(2001b): “A simplified feedback approach to optimal resource management,” Nat-
ural Resource Modeling, 14(3), 419–432.
Seierstad, A., and K. Sydsæter (1999): Optimal Control Theory with Economic Appli-
cations, Advanced textbooks in Economics. North-Holland, Amsterdam, second edn.
15
A Balancing Dynamic and Potential Rents
A derivation of the relation, Eq. (3), is offered here. This equation is at the heart of our
approach. It expresses the balance between the dynamic and potential rents that must be
fulfilled by the optimal path.
LetH and λ be the current value representations of the Hamiltonian and the shadow price
respectively. The Hamiltonian formulation results in the following definitions and system of
equations
H(x, u˜, λ)
def
= Π(x, u˜) + λ · (f(x)− u˜) ,
u˜ = argmax
u˜∈U
H , (Hu˜ = 0 for internal optimum)
x˙ = f(x)− u˜ = Hλ ,
λ˙ = δ λ−Hx .
A consequence of these equations is
H˙ = Hx x˙+Hu˜ ˙˜u+Hλλ˙+Ht = δ λ x˙.
For the cases studied the term Hu˜ ˙˜u = 0, either because Hu˜ = 0 (internal optimum) or
otherwise because ˙˜u = 0. The equation above replaces the equation for the shadow price i.e.
the equation for λ˙. By integration in time and a substitution to the state and policy space
we get
H = K + δ
∫ t
t0
λ x˙dt = K + δ
∫ x
α
λ dx .
K is a constant of integration, which also represent the value of the optimal Hamiltonian
at an arbitrary point in state and policy space on the optimal policy path. At an inner
dynamical optimum we have λ = Πu˜, and the result can be written as
H = K + δ
∫ x
α
Πu(z, u(z)) dz .
The feedback form of the policy, u = u˜(t) = u(x(t)) = u(x), has been used. This is Eq. (7)
which implies the main relation balancing dynamic and potential rents as expressed by Eq.
(3).
Observe that we switched from integration over t to integration over x because the first
order conditions for the current values are autonomous and t is a redundant parameter.
We may consider u = u(x) instead of u˜ = u˜(t), where u(x) and u˜(t) are entirely different
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functions, although connected through the fact that they have the same value at any given
point in time. The equation for x˙ is of no use in the state-control space. In a way we can
formally think of x as being observed and u(x) is our response to this observation. That is,
we do not need the evolution equation for the ”observable state” x in order to react in an
optimal way. This is of course just a formal phrasing. We are dealing with a deterministic
system and hence we can in principle alway calculate the path in state space from a given
initial position. It is in this context we must interpret the statement that the x˙-equation only
serve to connect the (x, u)-space to the time domain. We are simply studying the optimal
policy problem in phase space rather than investigating the trajectories parameterized by
time. In this setting a proper phase space analysis is indeed a feedback description.
B Derivation of Main Result
This appendix contains definitions, lemmas and propositions leading to a proof of our main
result as it is given in Theorem 1. We first state two important assumptions
Basic Assumptions
A1 The function Π(x, u) is twice differentiable in its arguments with Πu ≥ 0 and
−∞ < −m2(x) ≤ Πuu(x, u) ≤ −m1(x) < 0 on (x, u) ∈ A∗ ,
for some integrable functions m1 and m2.
A2 The scalar function ψ(x) is positive definite on x ∈ X and is defined by
ψ(x)
def
= S∗δ − S(x) + δ
∫ x
x∗
δ
µ(s)ds = S∗δ − Π(x, f(x)) + δ
∫ x
x∗
δ
Πu(s, f(s))ds.
The function ψ(x) ≡ N(x, f(x)) has a critical point at x = x∗δ , which is stated in Eq. (8).
We assume that this is representing a unique global minimum. Ψ plays the role of potential
rent gain and the stationary state is a state with no potential gain with the interpretation
that all potential rent is being continuously realized. Hence determination of the stationary
state x∗δ can be thought of as follows:
The preferred equilibrium state in a dynamic economic adjustment process is the state with
all potentials utilize and is determined by finding the global minimum of the scalar function
ψ(x).
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The following quantities play a key role in our proofs.
Q(x, u)
def
= M(x, u)−N(x, u) and (x, u) ∈ A∗(22)
A∗L
def
= {(x, u)| (x, u) ∈ A∗ & x ≤ x∗δ} ,(23)
A∗R
def
= {(x, u)| (x, u) ∈ A∗ & x ≥ x∗δ} .(24)
Notice that A∗L ∪ A∗R = A∗ and f(x)− u is not decreasing in A∗L and not increasing in A∗R.
We shall prove that Q(x, u) = 0 has a unique admissible solution such that
(x, u) ∈ B ∈ {A∗L, A∗R}. Moreover the iteration scheme M(x, un+1) = N(x, un) produces a
fast convergence to the solution for (x, un) ∈ B.
B.1 Some Basic Properties
The functional Q is well defined on the set of admissible feedback controls. The problems
stated in this paper are transferred to the problem of finding a feedback policy u∗(x) such
that Q = 0 and (x, u∗(x)) ∈ A∗. We will state and prove some basic inequalities and
monotonicity properties satisfied by the functional on A∗L and A
∗
R.
Lemma 1 Basic Inequalities
{f(x)− v} (Πu − Πv) ≤M(x, u)−M(x, v) ≤ {f(x)− u} (Πu − Πv) .(25)
hold for all (x, u) and (x, v) in A∗ and Πw is short for ∂∂wΠ(x,w). The function M(x, u) is
positive semidefinite.
Proof: These inequalities follow directly from the definition of M and the properties of Π.
From Eq. (4) we obtain
M(x, u)−M(x, v) = Π(x, u)− Π(x, v) + Πu(x, u) {f(x)− u} − Πv(x, v) {f(x)− v} ,
and the concavity of Π implies
Πu(x, u)(u− v) ≤ Π(x, u)− Π(x, v) ≤ Πv(x, v)(u− v)
and Eq. (25) is obtained. This proves the first part of the lemma. Putting v = f(x) and
using M(x, f(x)) ≡ 0 yields the semidefinite property of M .2
We can now state and prove the key monotonicity properties of the operators involved.
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Proposition 1 Main Monotonicity Properties
M(x, u), N(x, u) and Q(x, u) are all monotone in u on B ∈ {A∗L, A∗R}
Moreover,
1. (x− x∗δ)M(x, u) is non-decreasing in u on A∗,
2. (x− x∗δ)N(x, u) is non-increasing in u on A∗,
3. (x− x∗δ)Q(x, u) is non-decreasing in u on A∗.
Proof
We have Mu(x, u) = Πuu(x, u)(f(x)− u) and assumption A1 implies Mu ≤ 0 if u ≤ f(x)
and Mu ≥ 0 if u ≥ f(x).Hence M is monotone in B implying that (x− x∗δ)M(x, u) is
nondecreasing in A∗.
Let ∆uv be defined by
∆uv = ∆uv(x)
def
= Πu(x, u(x))− Πv(x, v(x)) .(26)
The concavity property of Π implies that ∆uv ≤ 0 when u ≥ v and vice versa. The
definition of the functional N(x, u) in Eq. (10) implies
(x− x∗δ)[N(x, u)−N(x, v)] = δ(x− x∗δ)
∫ x
x∗δ
∆uv(s)ds(27)
It follows directly that the left hand side of Eq. (27) has the sign of ∆uv when v ≥ u. Hence
(x− x∗δ)N(x, u) is non-increasing on A∗. The properties of Q follow from Q =M −N .2
We continue by investigating the iteration scheme and prove the general convergence result
given by Theorem 1.
B.2 Iteration Scheme
We are studying the equation Q(x, u) = 0, or
M(x, u) = N(x, u) for (x, u) ∈ A∗ .(28)
Introducing M as given by Eq. (4) has several advantages. The function M(x, u) measures
a potential gain of changing the state or moving in state space, i.e., there can be a beneficial
gain associated with changing the current state. It plays a role similar to the kinetic energy
in a mechanical system. The motion by itself has the potential of doing a physical work
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which can be viewed as advantageous. The functional N(x, u) as given by Eq. (10), can be
associated with potential energy. It has the potential to change the current state of motion.
The concavity property of Π(x, u) with respect to u, implies uniqueness of the solution of
Eq. (28) for (x, u) ∈ A∗.
Proposition 2 Uniqueness
Eq. (28) has at most one admissible solution.
Proof
Applying Eqs. (25-28) we get
{f(x)− v(x)}∆uv(x) ≤ δ
∫ x
x∗
δ
∆uv(s)ds ≤ {f(x)− u(x)}∆uv(x).(29)
Assume contrary to the proposition that u and v are two different solutions. If u 6= v in A∗
there exists an interval I bounded by x1 6= x∗δ and x∗δ such that u ≥ v in I and u > v in a
nonempty interval J ⊂ I. Let x = z be the center point in J . It follows that ∆uv(x) ≤ 0 in
I and strictly negative in J . We apply the natural restriction δ ≥ 0.
In A∗L we have f(z) ≥ u(z) > v(z) implying
{f(z)− v(z)}∆uv(z) < 0, δ
∫ z
x∗
δ
∆uv(s)ds ≥ 0 and {f(z)− u(z)}∆uv(z) ≤ 0.
In A∗R we have u(z) > v(z) ≥ f(z) and thereby
{f(z)− v(z)}∆uv(z) ≥ 0, δ
∫ z
x∗
δ
∆uv(s)ds ≤ 0 and {f(z)− u(z)}∆uv(z) > 0.
The proposition follows by noticing that both sets of inequalities above contradict the
relations in (29).2
In order capture some inherent properties of the structure defined in Eq. (28) we introduce
the concepts of super and sub solutions.
Definition 2 Super and Sub Solutions
An admissible control path in B ∈ {A∗L , A∗R} defined by u = u(x) such that u(x∗δ) = f(x∗δ)
is called a super solution if (x− x∗δ)Q(x, u) ≥ 0 and a sub solution if (x− x∗δ)Q(x, u) ≤ 0.
The monotonicity of the defining functional (Proposition 1) makes it a generalized ordering
of admissible feedback policies. It ensures that all admissible policy-paths are super
solutions if they are above the first best policy and sub solutions if they are below, i.e.
geometrical super (sub) solutions are formal super (sub) solutions.
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A main input to a model is the statement about (natural) growth or change. It is the
function f(x) in the present context. This key function is a super-sub function meaning
that it is super on the left side (A∗L) and sub on the right side (A
∗
R) as can be directly
verified by noticing that according to assumption A2 we have ψ(x) ≥ 0 and hence
(x− x∗δ)Q(x, f(x)) = −(x− x∗δ)ψ(x)
 ≥ 0, x < x
∗
δ
≤ 0, x > x∗δ
.
Indeed, this makes perfect sense given that any admissible policy is bounded from above by
f(x) in A∗L and from below by f(x) in A
∗
R and hence implying that f(x) is a geometrical
super-sub solution. A feedback solution which is both a super and sub solution on B must
coincide with the unique solution u∗.
We will later (Lemma 5) provide a result that makes it unnecessary to distinguish between
formal and geometric super or sub solutions.
In the next lemma we define main operators and summarizes their monotonicity.
Lemma 2 Core Monotonicity Properties
The following properties holds for admissible controls
1. TM(u)
def
= (x− x∗δ) ·M(x, u) is non-decreasing in u.
2. TN(u)
def
= (x− x∗δ) ·N(x, u) is non-increasing in u.
3. T (u)
def
= (x− x∗δ) ·Q(x, u) is non-decreasing in u.
This lemma is just a restatement of Proposition 1.2
We now define our solution procedure as an iteration scheme.
Definition 3 Iteration Scheme and Short Notation
Let {un} be a sequence of admissible policies. We denote
Mn
def
= M(x, un) and Nn
def
= N(x, un) .(30)
Iterations or iteration scheme is short for any admissible sequence defined by
Mn+1 = Nn.(31)
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The iterations converge right away if δ = 0. The exact solution is given by the first iterate
as the solution of the ordinary algebraic equation M(x, u1) = S(x
∗
0)− S(x). Basic structure
in the iteration scheme is revealed in next lemmas and propositions.
Lemma 3 Basic Alternating property
Let B ∈ {A∗L, A∗R} and x 6= x∗δ. Further let 3 represent a weak or strong inequality relation.
Then u3v implies V3U where U and V are the first iterates of u and v. Moreover there is
at most one iterate for each given admissible function.
Proof
The result is a direct consequence of the monotonic properties of TM and TN :
TM(V ) = TN(v)3TN(u) = TM(U) ⇒ V3U.
We have already pointed out that M(x, U) is strictly monotone in U for U 6= f(x) in B. It
means that the equation M(x, U) = K(x) ≥ 0 has at most one solution U = U(x). The
case K(t) = 0 for x = t is trivially given by U(t) = f(t). The implicit function theorem
ensures that M(x, U) = N(x, u) > 0 generates a function U = U(x) which is piecewise
smooth for any admissible function u. 2
Proposition 3 Alternating Sub-Super Sequences
The following properties hold for iterations in B ∈ {A∗L, A∗R}:
1. If there exist two consecutive elements un+1 ≥ un (less or equal), then un+1 is a super
(sub) solution and un is a sub (super) solution.
2. If an element in the sequence is a super or sub solution, the rest of the sequence will
alternate between sub and super solutions.
Proof
We will extensively utilize the following relations among the operators defined in Lemma 2:
TM(v) = TN(u) ⇒ T (u) = TM(u)− TM(v) and T (v) = TN(u)− TN(v)(32)
The first part or premise states that v is the iterate of u. Both implied relations follow
directly from the definitions of the iteration and the operators. Notice that the first
implied relation is a function of two points in A∗ while the second relation is not. The
latter depends on two paths. Inserting v = un+1 ≥ un = u in the first relation implies
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T (u) ≤ 0 and the second relation implies T (v) ≥ 0 or signs reversed if un+1 ≤ un. This
proves statement 1.
Let u = un be a super (sub) solution. The first implied relation in Eq. (32) gives
TM(u) ≥ TM(v) (or reversed inequality). This relation holds pointwise and the
monotonicity of TM ensures that v = un+1 is a sub (super) solution. Statement 2 is
established by reapplying the argument.2
Next lemma reveals a potential structure in super/sub sequences. They may contain two
subsequences of opposite monotonicity. The pattern is visualized in figure 3. More
precisely it reads:
Lemma 4 Increasing and Decreasing Subsequences
Let u0 > u2 for x 6= x∗δ. Then u2n > u2n+2 and u2n+1 < u2n+3 for x 6= x∗δ. In addition, if an
element is a super or sub solution the two subsequences {u2n} and {u2n+1} are bounded by
each other.
The results hold if all inequalities are reversed or in weak form.
Proof
Applying Lemma 3 to un and u2+n for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} for each inequality relation
establishes the two subsequences with their monotonicity properties. We demonstrate it for
the relational operator ”>”:
Direct use of Lemma 3 yields u0 > u2 ⇒ u1 < u3 ⇒ u2 > u4 ⇒ u3 < u5 . . . implying
u0 > u2 > u4 > . . . and u1 < u3 < u5 . . .
Without loss of generality we may assume that u0 is a super solution and the sequence is
alternating between super and sub solutions according to Proposition 3. Hence
u0 > u2 > u4 > . . . is a sequence of super solutions and u1 < u3 < u4 < . . . a sequence of
sub solutions. Moreover, u2n ≥ u2n+1 and the boundedness is established. Thus both
sequences are monotone and bounded and hence they converge.2
The next lemma allows us to focus on geometric super or sub solution. All formal super
(sub) solutions become geometric sub (super) solutions after a single iteration. This result
is indeed important. It implies that the first best solution is always between consecutive
iterates of a formal super (sub) seed that we know from Proposition 3 produces an
alternating sequence of sub and super solutions. There is now available a strait forward
way to test for super/sub properties and produce feedback policies on either side of the
unknown first-best solution.
Lemma 5 Formal and Geometrical Super or Sub Solutions
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A formal super or sub solution becomes a geometric sub or super solution after a single
iteration in B ∈ {A∗L, A∗R}.
Proof
Let v = v(x) be the iterate of u = u(x) and u∗ = u∗(x) be the optimal feedback solution.
Applying Eq. (26) and assuming x 6= x∗δ we define η(x) by
η(x)
def
= TM(v)− TM(u∗) = TN(u)− TN(u∗) = δ(x− x∗δ)
∫ x
x∗
δ
∆uu∗(s)ds
Let us investigate a crossing between v and u∗ at x = z. Crossing means that there is a
x = z such that v 6= u∗ immediately to the right in A∗R and to the left in A∗L and hence
η(x) 6= 0 for x in an nonempty interval J . In this interval we have ∆uu∗(x) 6= 0 and the
sign of η in J is given by
η(x)
δ(x− x∗δ)
=
η(z)
δ(x− x∗δ)
+
∫ x
z
∆uu∗(s)ds =
∫ x
z
∆uu∗(s)ds
⇓
sgn (η) = sgn (∆uu∗).(33)
Let u be a super solution and thereby v is a sub solution in accordance with Proposition 3.
This implies that v ≤ u. If v is not a geometric sub solution, it must cross u∗ from below
moving away from x∗δ . Otherwise v will be a super solution in the neighborhood of x
∗
δ !
Hence we have an interval J where u ≥ v > u∗ and thereby ∆uu∗ < 0 in the interval. The
definition of η and Eq. (33) imply TM(v) < TM(u
∗) in J which is contradicting the
assumption that J exists! The proof in the case with u being a sub solution is similar. 2
B.3 Convergence of Iterations
The iterations converge under quite general conditions. In this section we use a
constructive approach to prove this convergence. We start by proving the convergence for a
particular sequence starting from a geometric super-sub solution. Since there is no
convergence problems if δ = 0, we consider only the case δ > 0.
Let the function ρ be defined by the expression
ρ(x) =
δ| ∫ xx∗
δ
m2(s)ds|
m1(x)|f(x)− f2(x)|(34)
where f2 is the second iterate of f(x) and m1 and m2 are defined in assumption A1. The
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expression need not be defined for all x ∈ X.
The seed u0 = f(x) generates a special super-sub sequence {f0 = f, f1, f2, . . .} that can be
shown to converge under mild conditions. We state the result in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Convergence of a Special Sequence
The special sequence {f0, f1, f2 . . .} produced by f0 = f(x) in the iteration scheme converges
to the unique solution u∗ if ρ(x) < 1. The elements in the sequence are consecutive
geometric super and sub solutions and the unique solution is approximated by
u∗ =
1
2
(fn + fn+1) + ² where |²| ≤ 1
2
|fn − fn+1| .
Proof
The construction of the admissible sequences ensures convergence at x = x∗δ and we are
therefor only considering x 6= x∗δ in the proof. We have in A∗L that f0 > f2 and in A∗R that
f0 < f2. The weak inequalities follow directly from the definition of A
∗. The strict
inequalities come from
TM(f2) = TN(f1) = (x− x∗δ) · ψ(x) 6= 0 = TM(f) hence f2 6= f.
The nonzero condition is a result of assumption A2. By Lemma 4 we have two monotone
sequences f0 > f2 > f4 > . . . and f1 < f3 < f5 < . . . in A
∗
L, where the first is a sequence of
geometric super solution and the second a sequence of geometric sub solutions. Both
sequences are monotone and bounded and hence they converge. The same holds in A∗R
with reversed inequalities. We need to show that they converge to the same limit13, that is,
ruling out the existence of a period two cycle in the iteration scheme. It is done here by
proving that the iterations represent a contraction scheme. We have
|Mn+1 −Mn| = |Nn −Nn−1| = δ|
∫ x
x∗δ
[Πu(s, fn(s))− Πu(s, fn−1(s))]|
⇔ |Mu(x, θn)(fn−1 − fn)| = δ|
∫ x
x∗
δ
Πuu(s, φn−1(s))(fn(s)− fn−1(s)) ds|
⇔ |(f − θn)Πuu(x, θn)(fn−1 − fn)| = δ|
∫ x
x∗
δ
Πuu(s, φn−1(s))(fn(s)− fn−1(s))ds| .
The mean value theorem has been applied. θn and φn are between fn and fn+1. From the
first part of the proof we know that |f − θn| ≥ |f − f2| for n ≥ 1. Applying assumption A1
13The approximation formula holds even if there are no convergence to the same limit because u∗ is always
between consecutive iterates.
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we obtain
|f − f2|m1 |fn+1 − fn| ≤ δ
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ x
x∗δ
m2 · (fn − fn−1) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ x
x∗δ
m2 ds
∣∣∣∣∣ · ||fn − fn−1|| .
The maximum norm have been applied. In particular we obtain at a x 6= x∗δ where
|fn+1 − fn| = ||fn+1 − fn|| the following
|f − f2|m1 ||fn+1 − fn|| ≤ δ
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ x
x∗
δ
m2 ds
∣∣∣∣∣ · ||fn − fn−1|| or ||fn+1 − fn|| ≤ ρ||fn − fn−1|| .
This shows that the particular sequence is contracting.2
In figure 3 we illustrate a typical way that our policy sequences converge. Finally the result
“Nye iterasjoner”
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Figure 3: This figure shows schematically how the iterations work when started from a formal
super or sub seed with new iterations along the horizontal axis. Notice that the sequence
{us, us+2, us+4, · · ·} is monotonically decreasing whereas {ur, ur+2, ur+4, · · ·} is monotonically
increasing, converging to the same limit u∗.
can be generalize to an arbitrary sequence in A∗.
Proposition 5 General Convergence Result
Assume that the special sequence starting with u0 = f(x) converges. Then all admissible
infinite sequences converge.
Proof
Assume first that there exist an iterate uk bounded by f = f0 and f1. This implies by
repeated use of the weak inequality form of Lemma 3 that uk+n is bounded by fn and fn+1
and hence converge. Assume that there is an iterate uk not bounded by f1. Let us consider
an admissible policy u˜1 that bounds both uk and f1. On the left of the reference point we
must have u˜1 ≤ f1 ⇒ TN(u˜1) ≥ TN(f1)⇒ TM(u˜2) ≥ TM(f2)⇒ u˜2 ≥ f2 and reversed
inequalities to the right of the reference point. This means that the iterates of u˜2 are
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squeezed by the iterates of f0 and f2 and hence the sequence {u˜1, u˜2, u˜3, . . .} converge. In
turn this implies that the sequence with an element not bounded by f0 and f1 must
converge since it is squeezed between the iterates of f0 and u˜1.2
The last proposition ensures the general statement about convergence given in theorem 1.
The error bound given in the theorem must hold by the simple fact that the sequence {vn}
is an alternating geometrical super-sub sequence which implies that the optimal feedback
solution is between two consecutive iterations. This completes the proof of our main result.
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